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ABSTRACT
Preserving user privacy is paramount when it comes to pub-
licly disclosed datasets that contain fine-grained data about
large populations. The problem is especially critical in the
case of mobile traffic datasets collected by cellular oper-
ators, as they feature elevate subscriber trajectory unique-
ness and they are resistant to anonymization through spa-
tiotemporal generalization. In this work, we investigate the
k-anonymizability of trajectories in two large-scale mobile
traffic datasets, by means of a novel dedicated measure. Our
results are in agreement with those of previous analyses,
however they also provide additional insights on the reasons
behind the poor anonimizability of mobile traffic datasets.
As such, our study is a step forward in the direction of a
more robust dataset anonymization.
1. INTRODUCTION
Public disclosure of datasets containing micro-data,
i.e., information on precise individuals, is an increas-
ingly frequent practice. Such datasets are collected in a
number of different ways, including surveys, transaction
recorders, positioning data loggers, mobile applications,
and communicaiton network probes. They yield fine-
grained data about large populations that has proven
critical to seminal studies in a number of research fields.
However, preserving user privacy in publicly accessi-
ble micro-data datasets is currently an open problem.
Publishing an incorrectly anonymized dataset may dis-
close sensible information about specific users. This
has been repeatedly proven in the past. One of the first
and best known attempts at re-identification of badly
anonymized datasets was carried out by then MIT grad-
uate student Latanya Sweeney [1, 2] in 1996. By using
a database of medical records released by an insurance
company and the voter roll for the city of Cambridge
(MA), purchased for 20 US dollars, Dr. Sweeney could
successfully re-identify the full medical history of the
then governor of Massachusetts, William Weld. She
even sent the governor full health records, including di-
agnoses and prescriptions, to his office. A later, yet
equally famous experiment was performed by Narayanan
et al. [3] on a dataset released by Netflix for a data-
mining contest, which was cross-correlated with a web
scraping of the popular IMDB website. The authors
were able to match two users from both datasets re-
vealing, e.g., their political views.
Mobile traffic datasets include micro-data collected
at different locations of the cellular network infrastruc-
ture, concerning the movements and traffic generated by
thousands to millions of subscribers, typically for long
timespans in the order of weeks or months. They have
become a paramount instrument in large-scale analyses
across disciplines such as sociology, demography, epi-
demiology, or computer science. Unfortunately, mobile
traffic datasets may also be prone to attacks on individ-
ual privacy. Specifically, they suffer from the following
two issues.
1. Elevate uniqueness. Mobile subscribers have
very distinctive patterns that often make them
unique even within a very large population. Zang
and Bolot [4] showed that 50% of the mobile sub-
scribers in a 25 million-strong dataset could be
uniquely detected with minimal knowledge about
their movement patterns, namely the three loca-
tions they visit the most frequently. The result
was corroborated by de Montjoye et al. [5], who
demonstrated how an individual can be pinpointed
among 1.5 million other mobile customers with a
probability almost equal to one, by just knowing
five random spatiotemporal points contained in his
mobile traffic data.
Uniqueness does not implies identifiability, since the
sole knowledge of a unique subscriber trajectory can-
not disclose the subscriber’s identity. Building that cor-
respondence requires instead sensible side information
and cross-database analyses similar to those carried out
on medical or Netflix records. To date, there has been
no actual demonstration of subscriber re-identification
from mobile traffic datasets using such techniques – and
our study does not change that situation. Still, unique-
ness may be a first step towards re-identification, and
whether this represents a threat to user privacy is an
open topic for discussion [6, 7].
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In such a context, the standard, safe approach to en-
sure data confidentiality relies on non-technical solu-
tions, i.e., non-disclosure agreements that well define
the scope of the activities (e.g., fundamental research
only) carried out on the datasets, and that prevent open
disclosure of the data or results without prior verifica-
tion by the relevant authorities. This is, for instance,
the solution adopted in the case of the mobile traffic
information we will consider in Sec. 3.
Clearly, this practice can strongly limit the availabil-
ity of mobile traffic datasets, as well as the reproducibil-
ity of related research. Mitigating the uniqueness of
subscriber trajectories becomes then a very desirable fa-
cility that can entail more privacy-preserving datasets,
and favor their open circulation. It is however at this
point that the second problem of mobile traffic datasets
comes into play.
2. Low anonymizability. The legacy solution to re-
duce uniqueness in micro-data datasets is general-
ization and suppression. However, previous stud-
ies showed that blurring users in the crowd, by
reducing the spatial and temporal granularity of
the data, is hardly a solution in the case of mo-
bile traffic datasets. Zang and Bolot [4] found
that reliable anonymization is attained only un-
der very coarse spatial aggregation, namely when
the mobile subscriber location granularity is re-
duced to the city level. Similarly, de Montjoye et
al. [5] proved that a power-law relationship exists
between uniqueness and spatiotemporal aggrega-
tion of mobile traffic. This implies that privacy is
increasingly hard to ensure as the resolution of a
dataset is reduced. In conclusion, not only mobile
traffic datasets yield highly unique trjectories, but
the latter are also hard to anonymize. Ensuring
individual privacy risks to lower the level of de-
tail of such datasets to the point that they are not
informative anymore.
In this work, we aim at better investigating the rea-
sons behind such inconvenient properties of mobile traf-
fic datasets. We focus on anonymizability, since it is
a more revealing feature: multiple datasets that fea-
ture similar trajectory uniqueness may be more or less
difficult to anonymize. Attaining our objective brings
along the following contributions: (i) we define a mea-
sure of the level of anonymizability of mobile traffic
datasets, in Sec. 2; (ii) we provide a first assessment
of the anonymizability of two large-scale mobile traffic
datasets, in Sec. 3; (iii) we unveil the cause of elevate
uniqueness and poor anonymizability in such datasets,
i.e., the heavy tail of the temporal diversity among sub-
scriber mobility patterns, in Sec. 4. Finally, Sec. 5 con-
cludes the paper.
Table 1: Standard micro-data database format.
Pseudo-id Gender Age ZIP Degree Income . . .
00013701 Male 21 77005 Bachelor 13,000 . . .
08936402 Male 37 77065 Master’s 90,000 . . .
42330327 Female 60 89123 High School 46,000 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 2: Mobile traffic database format.
Pseudo-id Spatiotemporal samples (fingerprint)
a c1,8 c2,14 c3,17
b c4,8 c5,15 c6,15 . . . c13,15 c14,16 c15,17
c c16,7 c17,20
. . . . . .
2. HOW ANONYMIZABLE IS YOUR
MOBILE TRAFFIC FINGERPRINT?
In this section, we first define in a formal way the
problem of user uniqueness in mobile traffic datasets,
in Sec. 2.1. Then, we introduce the proposed measure
of anonymizability, in Sec. 2.2.
2.1 Our problem
In order to properly define the problem we target, we
need to introduce the notion of mobile traffic fingerprint
that is at the base of the mobile traffic dataset format.
We also need to specify the type of anonymity we con-
sider – in our case, k-anonymity. Next, we discuss these
aspects of the problem.
2.1.1 Mobile traffic fingerprint and dataset
Traditional micro-data databases are structured into
matrices where each row maps to one individual, and
each column to an attribute. An example is provided
in Tab.1. Individuals are associated to one identifier,
i.e., a value that uniquely pinpoints the user across
datasets (e.g., his complete name, social number, or
passport number). Since identifiers allow direct identi-
fication and immediate cross-database correlation, they
are never disclosed. Instead, they are replaced by a
pseudo-identifier, which is again unique for each individ-
ual, but changes across datasets (e.g., a random string
substituting the actual identifier). Then, standard re-
identification attacks leverage quasi-identifiers, i.e., a
sequence of known attributes of one user (e.g., the age,
gender, ZIP code, etc.) to recognize the user in the
dataset. If successful, the attacker has then access to
the complete record of the target user. This knowledge
can directly include sensitive attributes, i.e., items that
should not be disclosed because they may pertain to the
personal sphere of the individual (e.g., diseases, politi-
cal or religious views, sexual orientation, etc.). It can
also be exploited for further cross-database correlation
so as to extract additional private information about
the user.
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The same model directly applies to the case of mo-
bile traffic datasets. However, the database semantics
make all the difference here: while mobile users are the
obvious individuals whose privacy we want to protect,
attributes are now sequences of spatiotemporal samples.
Each sample is the result of an event that the cellular
network associated to the user. An illustration is pro-
vided in Fig. 1a, which portrays the trajectories of three
mobile customers, denoted with pseudo-identifiers a, b,
and c, respectively, across an urban area. User a inter-
acts with the radio access infrastructure at 8 am, while
he is in cell c1 along his trajectory. Then, he triggers
additional mobile traffic activities at 2 pm, while lo-
cated in a cell c2 in the city center, and at 5 pm, from
a cell c3 in the South-East city outskirts. The same
goes for users b and c. All these spatiotemporal sam-
ples are recorded by the mobile operator1 and constitute
the mobile traffic fingerprint of the user. The resulting
database has a format such as that in Tab.2, where
subscriber identifiers are replaced by pseudo-identifiers,
and each element of a user’s fingerprint is a cell and
hourly timestamp pair.
2.1.2 k-anonymity in mobile traffic
In order to preserve user privacy in micro-data, one
has to ensure that no individual can be uniquely pin-
pointed in a dataset. This principle has led to the defi-
nition of multiple notions of non-uniqueness, such as k-
anonymity [1], l-diversity [8] and t-closeness [9]. Among
those, k-anonymity is the baseline criterion, to which l-
diversity or t-closeness add further security layers that
cope with sensitive attributes or cross-database correla-
tion. More precisely, k-anonymity ensures that, for each
individual, the set of attributes (or its quasi-identifier
subset) is identical to that of at least other k-1 users.
In other words, each individual is always hidden in a
crowd of k, and thus he cannot be uniquely identified
among such other users.
Granting k-anonymity in micro-data databases im-
plies generalizing and suppressing data. As an exam-
ple, in order to ensure 2-anonymity on the age and ZIP
code attributes for the first user in Tab. 1 , one can
aggregate the age in twenty-year ranges, and the ZIP
codes in three-number ranges: both the first and sec-
ond user end up with a (20,40) age and 770** ZIP
code, which makes them both 2-anonymous. Clearly,
1The actual precision of the information recorded, both in
space and in time, can depend significantly on the nature of
the probes used by the operator. Typically, probes located
closer to the radio access can capture more events at a finer
granularity, but require more extensive deployments to at-
tain a similar coverage than lower-precision probes located
in the mobile network core. In all cases, our discussion is
independent of the mobile traffic data collection technique,
and all the analyses performed in this work can be applied
to any type of mobile traffic data.
the process is lossy, since the information granularity
is reduced. Many efficient algorithms have been pro-
posed that achieve k-anonymity in legacy micro-data
databases, while minimizing information loss [10].
Also in mobile traffic datasets, k-anonymity is re-
garded as a best practice, and data aggregation is the
common approach to achieve it [4, 5]. In this case,
one has to ensure that the fingerprint of each subscri-
ber is identical to that of at least other k-1 mobile
users in the same dataset. We remark that previous
works have typically considered a model of attacker who
only has partial knowledge of the subscribers’ finger-
prints, e.g., most popular locations [4] or random sam-
ples [5]. In order to counter such a attack model, a
partial k-anonymization, targeting the limited informa-
tion owned be the attacker, would be sufficient. How-
ever, we are interested in a general solution, so we do
not make any assumption on the precise knowledge of
the attacker, which can be diverse and possibly broad.
Thus, k-anonymizing the whole fingerprint of each sub-
scriber in the mobile traffic dataset is the only way to
deterministically ensure mobile user privacy.
Both spatial and temporal aggregations can be lever-
aged to attain this goal. Examples are provided in
Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c. In Fig. 1b, cells are aggregated in
large sets that roughly map to the nine major neigh-
borhoods of the urban area; also, time is aggregated
in two-hour intervals. The reduction of spatiotemporal
granularity allows 2-anonymizing mobile users a and
b: both have now a fingerprint composed by samples
(V,8-9), (III,14-15), and (VII,16-17). User c has
instead a different footprint, with samples (IV,6-7)
and (III,20-21). If we need to 3-anonymize all three
mobile customers in the example, then a further gener-
alization is required, as in Fig. 1c. There, the metropoli-
tan region is divided in West and East halves, and only
two time intervals, before and after noon, are consid-
ered. The result is that all subscribers a, b, and c have
identical fingerprints (West,1-12) and (East,13-24).
Clearly, this level of anonymization comes at a high cost
in terms of information loss, as the location data is very
coarse both in space and time.
This is precisely the problem of low anonymizability
of mobile traffic datasets unveiled by previous works [4,
5]: even guaranteeing 2-anonymization in a very large
population requires severe reductions of the spatiotem-
poral granularity, which limits the usability of the data.
2.2 A measure of anonymizability
We intend to devise a measure of anonymizability
that is based on the k-anonymity criterion. Thus, our
proposed measure evaluates the effort, in terms of data
aggregation, needed to make a user indistinguishable
from k-1 other subscribers.
We start by defining the distance between two spa-
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(a) Initial (b) Aggregated (c) More aggregated
Figure 1: Example of mobile traffic fingerprints of three subscribers. (a) Initial dataset granularity: user locations are
represented at cell level, and the temporal information has a hourly precision. (b) First aggregation level: positions
are recorded at each neighborhood, and the time granularity is reduced to two hours. (c) Second aggregation level:
location data is limited to Eastern or Western half of the city, and the time information is merged over 12 hours.
tiotemporal samples in the mobile traffic fingerprints of
two mobile users. Each sample is composed of a spa-
tial information (e.g., the cell location) and a temporal
information (e.g., the timestamp). The distance must
keep into account both dimensions. A generic formu-
lation of the distance between the i-th sample of a’s
fingerprint, (sai , t
a
i ), and the j-th sample of b’s finger-
print, (sbj , t
b
j), is
dab(i, j) = wsδs
(
sai , s
b
j
)
+ wtδt
(
tai , t
b
j
)
. (1)
Here, δs and δt are functions that determine the dis-
tance along the spatial and temporal dimensions, re-
spectively. The former thus operates on the spatial in-
formation in the two samples, sai and s
b
j, and the lat-
ter on the temporal information, tai and t
b
j . The fac-
tors ws and wt weigth the spatial and temporal contri-
butions in (1). In the following, we will assume that
the two dimensional have the same importance, thus
ws = wt = 1/2.
We shape the δs and δt functions by considering that
both spatial and temporal aggregations induce a loss of
information that is linear with the decrease of granular-
ity. However, above a given spatial or temporal thresh-
old, the information loss is so severe that the data is
not usable anymore. As a result, the functions can be
expressed as
δs
(
sai , s
b
j
)
=


dist
(
sai , s
b
j
)
δmaxs
if dist
(
sai , s
b
j
)
≤ δmaxs
1 otherwise,
(2)
and
δt
(
tai , t
b
j
)
=


|tai − t
b
j |
δmaxt
if |tai − t
b
j | ≤ δ
max
t
1 otherwise.
(3)
In (2), dist
(
sai , s
b
j
)
= |sai .x − s
b
j .x| + |s
a
i .y − s
b
j .y| is
the Taxicab distance [11] between the spatial compo-
nents of the samples, whose coordinates are denoted as
x and y in a valid map projection system. Both func-
tions fulfill the properties of distances, i.e., are positive
definite, symmetric, and satisfy the triangle inequality.
They range from 0 (samples are identical from a spatial
or temporal viewpoint) to 1 (samples are at or beyond
the maximum meaningful aggregation threshold). Con-
cerning the values of the thresholds, in the following we
will consider that the aggregation limits beyond which
the information deprivation is excessive are 20 km for
the spatial dimension (i.e., the size of a city, beyond
which all intra-urban movements are lost) and 8 hours
(beyond which the night, working hours, and evening
periods are merged together).
The sample distance in (1) can be used to define the
distance among the whole fingerprints of two mobile
subscribers a and b, as
∆ab =


1
na
na∑
h=1
min
k=1,...,nb
dab(h, k) if na ≥ nb
1
nb
nb∑
h=1
min
k=1,...,na
dab(k, h) otherwise.
(4)
Here, na and nb are the cardinalities of the fingerprints
of a and b, respectively. The expression in (4) takes the
longer fingerprint between the two, and finds, for each
sample, the sample at minimum distance in the shorter
4
fingerprint. The resulting ∆ab is the average among all
such sample distances, and ∆ab = ∆ba, ∀a, b.
The measure of anonymizability of a generic mobile
user a can be mapped, under the k-anonymity criterion,
to the average distance of his fingerprint from those of
the nearest k-1 other users. Formally
∆ka =
1
k − 1
∑
b∈N
k−1
a
∆ab, (5)
where Nk−1a is the set of k− 1 users b with the smallest
fingerprint distances to that of a.
The expression in (5) returns a measure ∆ka ∈ [0, 1]
that indicates how hard it is to hide subscriber a in a
the crowd of k users. If ∆ka = 0, then the user is al-
ready k-anonymized in the dataset. If ∆ka = 1, the user
is completely isolated, i.e., no sample in the fingerprints
of all other subscribers is within the spatial and tempo-
ral thresholds, δmaxs and δ
max
t , from any samples of a’s
fingerprint.
3. TWO MOBILE TRAFFIC USE CASES
We employ the proposed measure to assess the level
of anonymizability of fingerprints present in two mobile
traffic datasets released by Orange in the framework of
the Data for Development Challenge. In order to allow
for a fair comparison, we preprocessed the datasets so
as to make them more homogeneous.
• Ivory Coast. Released for the 2012 Challenge,
this dataset describes five months of Call Detail
Records (CDR) over the whole the African na-
tion of Ivory Coast. We used the high spatial
resolution dataset, containing the complete spatio
temporal trajectories for a subset of 50,000 ran-
domly selected users that are changed every two
weeks. Thus, the dataset contains information
about 10 2-weeks periods overall. We performed
a preliminary screening, discarding the most dis-
perse trajectories, keeping the users that have at
least one spatio-temporal point per day. Then, we
merged all the user that met this criteria in a sin-
gle dataset, so as to achieve a meaningful size of
around 82,000 users. This dataset is indicated as
d4d-civ in the following.
• Senegal. The 2014 Challenge dataset is derived
from CDR collected over the whole Senegal for one
year. We used the fine-grained mobility dataset,
containing a randomly selected subset of around
300,000 users over a rolling 2-week period, for a to-
tal of 25 periods. We did not filter out subscribers,
since the dataset is already limited to users that
are active for more than 75% of the 2-week time
span. In our study, we consider one representative
2-week period among those available. This dataset
is referred to as d4d-sen in the following.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
∆
2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
C
D
F
d4d-civ
d4d-sen
0.09 0.17
Figure 2: CDF of the anonymizability measure, under
the 2-anonymity criterion, in the d4d-civ and d4d-sen
mobile traffic datasets.
In both the mobile traffic datasets, the information about
the user position2 is provided as a latitude and longi-
tude pair. We projected the latter in a two-dimensional
coordinate system using the Lambert azimuthal equal-
area projection. We then discretize the resulting posi-
tions on a 100-m regular grid, which represents the max-
imum spatial granularity we consider3. As far as the
temporal dimension is concerned, the maximum preci-
sion granted by both datasets is one minute, and this is
also our finest time granularity.
4. RESULTS
The measure of anoymizability in (5) can be intended
as a dissimilarity measure, and employed in legacy def-
initions used to understand micro-data database spar-
sity, e.g., (ε,δ)-sparsity [3]. However, these defini-
tions are less informative than the complete distribution
of the anonymizability measure. Thus, in this section,
we employ Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF)
of the measure in (5) in order to assess the anonymiz-
ability of the two datasets presented before.
4.1 The good: anonymity is close to reach
Our basic result is shown in Fig. 2. The plot portrays
the CDF of the anonymizability measure computed on
all users in the two reference mobile traffic datasets,
d4d-civ and d4d-sen, when considering 2-anonymity
as the privacy criterion.
We observe that the two curves are quite similar, and
both are at zero in the x-axis origin. This means that no
single mobile subscriber is 2-anonymous in either of the
original datasets. Since similar observations were made
on different data [4, 5], our results seem to confirm that
2The spatial information maps to the antenna location in
d4d-civ, and to a random point within the voronoi cell as-
sociated to the antenna in d4d-sen.
3At 100-m spatial granularity, each square cell contains
at most one antenna or voronoi location from the original
dataset. In other words, this discretization does not implies
any spatial aggregation.
5
Increasing k
0
25
50
75
100
k
le
v
e
l
(a) d4d-civ
Increasing k
0
25
50
75
100
k
le
v
e
l
(b) d4d-sen
Figure 3: CDF of the anonymizability measure, for
varying k of the k-anonymity criterion, in the d4d-civ
and d4d-sen mobile traffic datasets.
the elevate uniqueness of subscriber trajectories is an
intrinsic property of any mobile traffic dataset, and not
just a specificity of those we analyse in this study.
More interestingly, the probability mass gathered in
both cases in the 0.1-0.2 range, i.e., it is quite close to
the origin. This is good news, since it implies that the
average aggregation effort needed to achieve 2-anonymity
is not elevate. As an example, 50% of the users in the
d4d-civ dataset have a measure 0.09 or less, which
maps, on average, to a combined spatiotemporal ag-
gregation of less than one km and little more than 20
minutes. In other words, the result seems to suggest
that half of the individuals in the dataset can be 2-
anonymized if the spatial granularity is decreased to
1 km, and the temporal precision is reduced to around
20 minutes. Similar considerations hold in the d4d-sen
case, where, e.g., 80% of the dataset population has a
measure 0.17 or less. Such a measure is the result of
average spatial and temporal distances of 1.7 km and
41 minutes from 2-anonymity.
One may wonder how more stringent privacy require-
ments affect these results. Fig. 3 shows the evolution of
the anonymizability of the two datasets when k varies
from 2 to 100. As expected, higher values of k require
that a user is hidden in a larger crowd, and thus shift
the distributions towards the right, implying the need
for a more coarse aggregation. However, quite surpris-
ingly, the shift is not dramatic: 100-anonymity does not
appear much more difficult to reach than 2-anonymity.
4.2 The bad: aggregation does not work
Unfortunately, the easy anonymizability suggested by
the distributions is only apparent. Fig. 4 depicts the im-
pact of spatiotemporal generalization on anonymizabil-
ity: each curve maps to a different level of aggregation,
from 100 meters and 1 minute (the finer granularity) to
20 km and 8 hours. As one could expect, the curves
are pushed towards smaller values of the anonymizabil-
ity measure. However, the reduction of spatiotemporal
precision does not have the desired magnitude, and even
a coarse-grained citywide, 8-hour aggregation cannot 2-
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(a) d4d-civ
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(b) d4d-sen
Figure 4: CDF of the anonymizability measure, under
the 2-anonymity criterion and for varying spatiotem-
poral aggregation levels, in the d4d-civ and d4d-sen
mobile traffic datasets. The legend reports the level of
spatial (in kilometers) and temporal (in minutes) ag-
gregation each curve refers to.
anonymize but 30% of the mobile users.
This result is again in agreement with previous stud-
ies [4, 5], and confirms that mobile traffic datasets are
difficult to anonymize.
4.3 The why: long-tailed temporal diversity
We are interested in understanding the reasons be-
hind the incongruity above, i.e., the fact that spatiotem-
poral aggregation yields such poor performance, even if
the average effort needed to attain k-anonymity is in
theory not elevate.
To attain our goal, we proceed along two directions.
First, we separate the spatial and temporal dimensions
of the measure in (5), so as to understand their precise
contribution to the dataset anonymizability. Second, we
measure the statistical dispersion of the fingerprint dis-
tances along the two dimensions: the rationale is that
we observed the average distance among fingerprints to
be quite small, thus the reason of the low anonymizabil-
ity must lie in the deviation of sample distances around
that mean.
4.3.1 Impact of space and time dimensions
Formally, we consider, for each user a in the dataset,
the set Nk−1a of k-1 other subscribers whose fingerprints
are the closest to that of a, according to (5). Then, we
disaggregate all the fingerprint distances ∆ab between
a and the users b ∈ Nk−1a into sample distances dab, as
per (4). Finally, we separately collect the spatial and
temporal components of all such sample distances, in
(1), into ordered sets Ska = {wsδs} and T
k
a = {wtδt}.
The resulting sets can be treated as disjoint distribu-
tions of the distances, along the spatial and temporal
dimensions, between the fingerprint of a generic indi-
vidual a and those of the k-1 other users that show the
most similar patterns to his.
Examples of the spatial and temporal distance dis-
tributions we obtain in the case of 2-anonymity are
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Figure 5: (a)-(e) CDF of the sample distance, and of its spatial and temporal components, under the 2-anonymity
criterion, for five random mobile users in the d4d-civ and d4d-sen mobile traffic datasets. (f) Contribution of the
temporal components to the total sample distance, expressed as the ratio between the sums of temporal component
distances and spatial component distances.
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Figure 6: (a,c) CDF of the Gini coefficient computed on the sample distance distributions of all users in the d4d-civ
and d4d-sen datasets, for the 2-anonymity criterion. (b,d) CDF of the Tail weight index computed on the sample
distance distributions of all users in the d4d-civ and d4d-sen datasets, for the 2-anonymity criterion.
shown in Fig. 5a-5e. Each plot refers to one random
user in the d4d-civ or d4d-sen dataset, and portrays
the CDF of the spatial (wsδs) and temporal (wtδt) com-
ponent distance, as well as that of the total sample dis-
tance (d). We can remark that temporal components
typically bring a significantly larger contribution to the
total fingerprint distance than spatial ones. In fact, a
significant portion of the spatial components is at zero
distance, i.e., is immediately 2-anonymous in the orig-
inal dataset. The same is not true for the temporal
components.
A rigorous confirmation is provided in Fig. 5f, which
shows the distribution of the temporal-to-spatial com-
ponent ratios, i.e.,
∑
Tk
a
wtδt/
∑
Sk
a
wsδs, for all subscribers
a in the two reference datasets. The CDF is skewed to-
wards high values, and for half of mobile subscribers
in both d4d-civ or d4d-sen datasets temporal compo-
nents contribute to 80% or more of the total sample
distance. We conclude that the temporal component of
a mobile traffic fingerprint is much harder to anonymize
than the spatial one. In other words, where an individ-
ual generates mobile traffic activity is easily masked,
but hiding when he carries out such activity it is not so.
4.3.2 Dispersion of fingerprint sample distances
Not only temporal components weight much more
than spatial ones in the fingerprint distance, but they
also seem to show longer tails in Fig. 5a-5e. Longer
tails imply the presence of more samples with a large
distance: this, in turn, significantly increases the level
of aggregation needed to achieve k-anyonimity, as the
latter is only granted once all samples in the fingerprint
have zero distance from those in the second fingerprint.
We rigorously evaluate the presence of a long tail of
hard-to-anonymize samples by means of two comple-
mentary metrics, still separating their spatial and tem-
poral components. The first metric is the Gini coeffi-
cient, which measures the dispersion of a distribution
around its mean. Considering an ordered set S = {si},
the coefficient is computed as
G (S) = 1−
2
∑N
i=1 isi +
∑N
i=1 si
N
∑N
i=1 si
, (6)
where N is the cardinality of S. We compute the Gini
coefficient on the sets Ska and T
k
a, for all users a.
The second metric is the Tail weight index [12], which
quantifies the weight of the tail of a distribution with
empirical CDF F as
TF =
F−1 (0.99)− F−1 (0.5)
F−1 (0.75)− F−1 (0.5)
Φ−1 (0.75)− Φ−1 (0.5)
Φ−1 (0.99)− Φ−1 (0.5)
.
(7)
In the expression above, F−1(·) is the inverse function
of the empirical CDF and Φ−1(·) is the inverse function
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of a standard normal CDF. We compute again the Tail
weight index on the distributions obtained from both
S
k
a and T
k
a, for all a.
Fig. 6 shows the results returned by the two metrics
in the d4d-civ or d4d-sen datasets. No significant dif-
ferences emerge among the two mobile traffic datasets.
In both cases, the Gini coefficient, in Fig. 6c and Fig. 6a,
has, for all mobile user fingerprints (d), high values
around 0.5 that denote significant dispersion around the
mean. However, two opposite behaviors are observed
for the spatial (wsδs) and temporal (wtδt) components.
The former show cases where no dispersion at all is
recorded (coefficient close to zero), and cases where the
distribution is very sparse. The latter has the same
behavior as the overall distance, with values clustered
around 0.5. The result (i) corroborates the observation
that the overall anonymizability is driven by distances
along the temporal dimension, and (ii) imputes the lat-
ter to the complete absence of easy-to-anonymize short
tails in the distribution of temporal distances.
Fig. 6d and Fig. 6b show instead the CDF of Tail
weight indices. Here, the result is even more clear: the
tail of temporal component distances is typically much
longer than that of spatial ones, and in between those
of exponential and heavy-tailed distributions4. Once
more, the temporal component tail fundamentally shapes
that of the overall fingerprint distance.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
At the light of all previous observations, we confirm
the findings of previous works on user privacy preserva-
tion in mobile traffic datasets. Namely, the two datasets
we analysed do not grant k-anonymity, not even for
the minimum k = 2. Moreover, our reference datasets
show poor anonymizability, i.e., require important spa-
tial and temporal generalization in order to slightly im-
prove user privacy. The fact that these properties have
been independently verified across diverse datasets of
mobile traffic suggests that the elevate uniqueness of
trajectories and low anonymizability are intrinsic prop-
erties of this type of datasets.
In our case, even a citywide, 8-hour aggregation is
not sufficient to ensure complete 2-anonymity to all sub-
scribers. The result is even worse than that observed in
previous studies: the difference is due to the fact that
we consider the anonymization of complete subscriber
fingerprints, whereas past works focus on simpler obfus-
cation of summaries [4] or subsets [5] of the fingerprints.
Our analysis also unveiled the reasons behind the
poor anonymizability of the mobile traffic datasets we
consider, as follows.
On the one hand, the typical mobile user fingerprint
4As a reference, an exponential distribution with mean equal
to 1 has a Tail weight index of 1.6, and a Pareto distribution
with shape 1 has an Tail weight index of 14.
in such datasets is composed of many spatiotemporal
samples that are easily hidden among those of other
users in the dataset. This leads to fingerprints that ap-
pear easily anonymizable, since their samples can be
matched, on average, with minimal spatial and tempo-
ral aggregation.
On the other hand, mobile traffic fingerprints tend
to have a non-negligible number of elements that are
much more difficult to anonymize than the average sam-
ple. These elements, which determine a characteristic
dispersion and long-tail behavior in the distribution of
fingerprint sample distances, are mainly due to a signif-
icant diversity along the temporal dimension. In other
words, mobile users may have similar spatial finger-
prints, but their temporal patterns typically contain a
non-negligible number of dissimilar points.
It is the presence of these hard-to-anonymize elements
in the fingerprint that makes spatiotemporal aggrega-
tion scarcely effective in attaining anonymity. Indeed,
in order to anonymize a user, one needs to aggregate
over space and time, until all his long-tail samples are
hidden within the fingerprints of other subscribers. As
a result, even significant reductions of granularity (and
consequent information losses) may not be sufficient to
ensure non-uniqueness in mobile traffic datasets.
As a concluding remark, we recall that such unique-
ness does not implies direct identifiability of mobile
users, which is much harder to achieve and requires, in
any case, cross-correlationwith non-anonymized datasets.
Instead, uniqueness is a first step towards re-identification.
Understanding its nature can help developing mobile
traffic datasets that are even more privacy-preserving,
and thus more easily accessible.
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